Ransomware has changed. The mental model most executives still carry (files get encrypted, you pay for the key, you move on) describes attacks from a decade ago. Modern ransomware is a full intrusion campaign that happens to end in encryption, and understanding how it really unfolds is the difference between defending the whole attack and defending only the last step.
The modern ransomware kill chain
A typical enterprise ransomware event is not a single moment. It is a campaign that plays out over days, sometimes weeks, even though its first moves take minutes: CrowdStrike measured an average of 29 minutes from initial access to lateral movement in 2025 (2026 Global Threat Report). The stages:
- Initial access. Attackers get in through a phished credential, an exposed remote service, an unpatched internet-facing vulnerability, or a purchased foothold from an access broker. Rarely is it an exotic zero-day. It is usually something an assessment would have flagged.
- Establishing persistence. They install backdoors and create accounts so that closing the original hole does not evict them.
- Privilege escalation and lateral movement. This is the quiet, dangerous middle. Attackers harvest credentials, move host to host, and work toward domain administrator or its cloud equivalent. Most dwell time lives here, and most of it goes undetected.
- Exfiltration. Before encrypting anything, modern groups steal your data. This enables the second extortion lever and increasingly the primary one.
- Deployment. Only at the end do they push the ransomware across the estate, often disabling backups and security tooling first, and time it for a weekend or holiday.
The insight that should reshape your defenses: encryption is the last thing that happens. By the time files lock, the attacker has been inside for a while: a median of three days in the 661 incidents behind Sophos’s 2026 Active Adversary Report, which also found attackers reaching the Active Directory server in 3.4 hours and 88% of ransomware payloads deployed outside business hours. Every earlier stage was an opportunity to detect and stop them. Our ransomware statistics page keeps these figures current.
How ransomware groups gain initial access
Most groups work as ransomware-as-a-service: a core team maintains the malware and the leak site, and recruited affiliates carry out the intrusions for a share of each payment, which is how CISA describes LockBit. Affiliates take the cheapest way in. Among 2,158 organizations hit in the past year, the root cause was a malicious email in 26%, phishing in 24%, compromised credentials in 23% and an exploited vulnerability in 18% (Sophos State of Ransomware 2026).
Ransomware kill chain: stage, signal and test
Each stage maps to a MITRE ATT&CK tactic, leaves something a defender can see, and has a test that checks whether you would see it.
| Stage | ATT&CK tactic | What defenders can see | Test that covers it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial access | Initial Access (TA0001) | Sign-ins from new devices or locations, MFA prompts a user did not start, exploit attempts against internet-facing services | External network penetration test, phishing test |
| Persistence | Persistence (TA0003) | New accounts, scheduled tasks, services or remote access tools nobody requested | Internal penetration test |
| Privilege escalation and lateral movement | Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Credential Access (TA0006), Lateral Movement (TA0008) | One account requesting many Kerberos service tickets, processes reading LSASS memory, administrator logons from workstations to servers | Internal penetration test, Active Directory security assessment |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration (TA0010) | Archive tools and cloud sync clients on servers, large outbound transfers to new destinations | Segmentation testing, red team exercise |
| Deployment | Impact (TA0040) | Volume shadow copies deleted with vssadmin or wbadmin (Inhibit System Recovery, T1490), security tools stopped, mass file renames | Ransomware readiness assessment |
Why backups are necessary but not sufficient
Reliable, tested, offline backups remain essential. They are your answer to the encryption. But they are no answer at all to the exfiltration.
This is double extortion: pay to decrypt your files, and pay to stop us publishing the data we already took. Solid backups solve the first demand and do nothing for the second. Some groups have dropped encryption entirely and simply steal and extort: CISA and the FBI report that BianLian moved to exfiltration-only extortion around January 2024 (advisory AA23-136A). If your entire ransomware strategy is “we have backups,” you are prepared for one half of a modern attack.
Backups can also fail on the first half. Operators go after them before deploying, and a backup system that trusts the same domain the attacker has just taken over leaves nothing to restore. A ransomware readiness assessment, from $6,000, tests exactly that: whether the accounts an attacker would hold after one phished laptop can reach, alter or delete your backups, and whether anyone would notice first.
Where testing breaks the chain
Because ransomware follows a predictable path, proactive testing maps directly onto it:
- External network penetration testing finds the exposed services, weak credentials, and unpatched systems that provide initial access, the first link in the chain.
- Internal penetration testing simulates the attacker who is already inside and tries to escalate and move laterally. This is the single most valuable exercise for ransomware resilience, because it targets the long, quiet middle where real attacks are won or lost. When the domain itself is the worry, an Active Directory security assessment maps the paths to Domain Admin on their own.
- Phishing and social engineering assessments test the human entry point that begins a large share of intrusions.
- Segmentation testing proves whether a foothold in one area can actually reach your critical systems, or whether your network limits the blast radius.
- Adversary simulation, run as a red team exercise, tests whether your team detects and stops the whole chain, not only whether the gaps exist.
Testing does not just produce findings. It answers the question that matters to leadership: if an attacker got in tomorrow, how far could they get before hitting a wall, and would we see them coming?
Building real resilience
A defensible ransomware posture combines several layers:
- Reduce initial access: patch internet-facing systems promptly, enforce multi-factor authentication everywhere, and eliminate exposed remote services.
- Detect the middle: monitor for the lateral movement and credential abuse that precede deployment, so you catch the attack during dwell time rather than at encryption.
- Contain the blast radius: segment networks and enforce least privilege so one compromised host is not a path to everything.
- Prepare to recover: maintain tested, offline, immutable backups, and rehearse the recovery.
- Prepare to respond: have an incident response plan that assumes data was stolen, not just encrypted.
These layers follow the joint #StopRansomware Guide from CISA, the NSA, the FBI and MS-ISAC, which groups its prevention advice by initial access vector and tells organizations to keep offline, encrypted backups because many ransomware variants look for reachable backups and delete or encrypt them.
Frequently asked questions
How do ransomware groups typically gain initial access? Through email, stolen credentials and unpatched internet-facing systems. In Sophos’s 2026 survey of organizations that were hit, malicious email, phishing and compromised credentials together accounted for 73% of root causes, and exploited vulnerabilities for 18%.
How long are attackers in a network before deploying ransomware? Usually days. Sophos’s 2026 incident data puts median dwell time at three days, and CrowdStrike measured an average of 29 minutes from first access to lateral movement, so the window to catch them is short but real.
Do backups protect against double extortion? Only against the encryption half. Backups let you restore systems, but they do nothing about data the attacker already copied, and they fail on both halves if the attacker can reach and delete them first.
What is a ransomware readiness assessment? A test of what happens after one phished laptop: whether the accounts an attacker would then hold can reach, alter or delete your backups, and whether anyone would notice first. Ours starts at $6,000.
The takeaway
Ransomware is an intrusion first and an encryption event last. Defending only against the encryption, the part everyone pictures, leaves the entire earlier campaign unaddressed. The organizations that weather ransomware best are the ones that hunt for attackers during the quiet middle and prove, through regular testing, that their defenses actually hold. If you want to know how a real intrusion would play out in your environment, scope an internal test that simulates exactly that, or see the internal penetration testing cost by network size first.
Written by
Mark Kiss, Founder & CEO
15+ years in the field. Focus: Offensive security & strategy. Part of the team that scopes, tests, and reports for our clients. Full profile →